Entrepreneurial Finance and Economic Growth by Paolo Giordani
Entrepreneurial Finance and Economic Growth
Paolo E. Giordani
June 2013
Abstract
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1 Introduction
The process of innovation in capitalistic economies is fraught with several market fric-
tions and failures. The most commonly known source of failure is the so-called prob-
lem of "appropriability", rst clearly stated by Arrow (1962). Since a new idea has
a non-rivalrous nature, some form of intellectual property rights may be necessary to
provide inventors with the right incentives to spend time and resources in the discovery
process. A second, and probably less extensively investigated, source of market failure
is concerned with the process of nancing innovation, that is, with the problem for
the innovator of gathering enough funds to nance her entrepreneurial venture. This
paper focuses on this second issue.
Both microeconomic theory and empirical evidence have long recognized the poten-
tial obstacles hidden in the process of nancing innovation, suggesting that inventors
may be nancially constrained.1 Theoretical arguments, proposed to explain nancial
market imperfections in the innovation sector, range from transaction costs and tax
advantages to agency costs due to informational asymmetries between the innovator
(agent) and the nancier (principal). While these aspects are common to any nancing
relationship, a number of additional elements suggest that frictions can be even more
severe for innovative investments. First, innovations are unique events, and the
process aimed at producing them is an uncertain and largely unpredictable economic
activity (Cozzi and Giordani, 2011). Secondly, as most of the R&D expenditure is on
intangible assets (such as scientistswages), this expenditure provides bad collateral
for the nancier (Almeida and Campello, 2004). Finally, a quality-signaling strategy,
which could be used to attenuate the problem of asymmetric information between the
entrepreneur and the nancier, is hardly implementable in the market of innovation:
inventors may be reluctant to signal the quality of their own project, as they may
reasonably fear that competitors steal their new idea (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983).
On the other hand, macroeconomic literature, and in particular endogenous innovation-
driven growth theory, usually abstract from the problem of nancing innovation (see for
instance, Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b)
and subsequent developments). In such models, a frictionless nancial market exists
that channels resources from savers to the R&D process, revealing the true value of
each innovation. The process of innovation is depicted as a routinized and essentially
predictable process.
1For a thorough review of these issues, refer to Hall and Lerner (2010).
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This paper casts a bridge between these two streams of literature. It develops an
endogenous growth model where the nancing process of innovation is characterized
by market frictions, and it analyzes the welfare implications of these frictions. In par-
ticular, we construct a scale-free endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation
(Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, Jones, 1995a,b). The economy is char-
acterized by three sectors: (i) a nal good sector, in which a nal good is produced
competitively employing labor and an array of intermediate goods; (ii) an intermediate
good sector, in which each intermediate good is produced and sold by a monopolistic
rm, and (iii) an "industry of new ideas", which employs labor to introduce new vari-
eties of intermediate goods. Technological progress is embodied by the increase in the
number of intermediate good varieties introduced into the market.
The peculiarity of our growth model lies in the way technological progress occurs: a
new intermediate variety is the outcome of a successful process of search and matching
between entrepreneurs (or innovators), who come up with new ideas and capitalists
(or nanciers), who select what they believe are the most promising ideas and help
launch them in the market. In particular, entrepreneurs and nanciers meet pairwise
and, once a successful matching has occurred, they bargain over the distribution of the
monopoly rents associated with the "discovery" of the new intermediate good variety.
The model studies the occupational choice of economic agents. Agents have to
decide whether to work in the nal good sector or in the "industry of ideas". In this
last case, they can choose to devote their time to come up with a new idea, and hence
to become entrepreneurs. Alternatively, they may opt for screening and selecting the
most valuable ideas deserving nancial funds, in which case they become capitalists.
We nd the employment allocation across the three occupational possibilities of this
economy along the balanced growth path: manufacturing, entrepreneurial and capital-
istic activities. This allocation is found by imposing that, at equilibrium, the expected
returns from each of these activities be identical.
We show that the nancial market for innovation is characterized by a complemen-
tary relationship between entrepreneurs and nanciers, in that the number of entre-
preneurs is increasing in the number of nanciers, and viceversa. The intuition for this
result is straightforward: a higher number of nanciers simply raises the entrepreneurs
chance of having her own project being selected and nanced, and thus it raises the
incentive to become entrepreneur, and viceversa. Because of this thick market exter-
nality, we cannot exclude the possibility that the economy admits multiple stationary
equilibria.
3
The equilibrium employment allocation is then compared to the optimal allocation
obtained through the welfare analysis. The amount of total labor resources that the
market allocates to entrepreneurial innovation is sub-optimal and, moreover, it is inef-
ciently distributed between entrepreneurs and capitalists. In particular, in addition
to the usual externalities associated with the class of horizontal innovation models à la
Romer (1990), our model allows us to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the search frictions
in the market for innovation. As we will clariy in Section 5, the occupational choice of
each economic agent a¤ects the payo¤ and the choice of all other agents. In particular,
the entry of an entrepreneur stimulates the entry of capitalists ("easy matching e¤ect")
and discourages the entry of additional entrepreneurs ("stepping on toes e¤ect"), and
a symmetric reasoning applies to the entry of a capitalist. Moroever, the fact that
the allocation of the monopoly rents is made according to a Nash bargaining process
between entrepreneurs and nanciers introduces an additional source of frictions: the
bargaining power of each agent does not necessarily reect their marginal productivity
in the innovation process. The overall e¤ect on the market of innovation, which is not
internalized by either entrepreneurs or capitalists when making their choices, may be
positive or negative. As a result, total market-driven innovative e¤orts may be higher
or lower than optimal. The existence of these external e¤ects is an additional reason
for the policy maker to intervene in the innovation sector.
The modeling strategy that we follow in this paper is meant to capture some salient
features of the nancial market for innovation. In the words of Phelps (2009, p. 50),
"the classical supply-and-demand apparatus does not apply to the core market of
capitalist economies - the capital market, particularly the market for capital going to
entrepreneursinnovative projects". It takes time and resources for an entrepreneur to
nd and convince a nancier about the protability of her business venture. At the
same time, it takes time and resources for a nancier to nd the innovative project that
she believes it is worth nancing. The nancial market for innovation is then, probably,
better represented as a decentralized market where heterogeneous entrepreneurs and
nanciers meet bilaterally according to a matching technology. Again in the words of
Phelps (2009, p. 52), "the capital market is a sort of matching process that matches
a nancier to an entrepreneur who the former sees as having a model compatible with
his own model". The search and matching process is a modeling tool that allows us to
represent succintly all frictions characterizing the process of nancing innovation - such
as information imperfections, or the entrepreneursand capitalistsheterogeneities in
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skills, location, beliefs etc.2
This representation of the nancing relationship is also especially apt to describe
the practical functioning of the modern venture capital (VC) industry, where a nanced
entreprenerial project is the result of a meeting between an entrepreneur submitting
her business plan, and a VC fund that is expected to bring managerial and/or techni-
cal expertise together with nancial investments (see for instance Gompers and Lerner,
1999). Venture capital is a relatively novel model of innovation nancing, and it com-
plements the more traditional, corporate R&D model. A debate is open as to whether
entrepreneurial nance is going to replace corporate R&D as the new standard of -
nancing innovation. On the one hand, the former still represents a tiny fraction of
the latter (Lerner, 2010). On the other hand, evidence suggests that entrepreneur-
ial investments are growing faster and are more productive than R&D investments.3
Moreover, they are disproportianately concentrated in the most innovative industries
(ICT, biotechnology and, more recently, energy and environment). Our model can be
interpreted as a rst attempt to introduce, into an endogenous growth model, a role
for the venture capital sector as the engine of economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 further discusses the related
literature. Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 characterizes the balanced
growth path(s) of the economy and carries out the comparative statics analysis. Section
5 carries out the welfare analysis and discusses the policy implications. Section 6
concludes with a few remarks.
2 Related Literature
This paper is broadly related to the vast literature on the link between nance, inno-
vation and economic growth. Key contributions in this eld include King and Levine
(1993), Aghion et al. (2004), Greenwood et al. (2010), Chiu et al. (2013) (for a survey
see Levine, 2005). In this respect, our specic contribution is the one of incorporating
the process of entrepreneurial nance into an otherwise standard endogenous growth
model.
Other papers have described entrepreneurial nance as a search and matching
2Prior to nance, search theory has been extensively used in diverse economics elds, such as labor
economics, monetary theory, and the theory of marriage.
3According to an empirical study by Kortum and Lerner (2000), one dollar of venture capital
generates as much innovation as three dollars of traditional corporate R&D.
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process beween entrepreneurs and capitalists. A few papers emphasize the microeco-
nomic foundations of the search and bargaining frictions (Silveira and Wright, 2007,
Silveira and Wright, 2010). Others focus on the nature and on the implications of the
relationship between entrepreneurs and capitalists (Cipollone and Giordani, 2013), or
on the contractual content of this relationship (Inderst and Muller, 2004, Boadway et
al., 2005). This paper brings this formalization into a general equilibrium framework,
and it analyzes its welfare consequences. The great step ahead of R&D-based growth
models with respect to neoclassical growth, that is, the idea that "inventions require
inventors" (Jones, 1995b, p.760), is here further extended to the idea that inventions
require not only inventors but also capitalists. In this respect, two contributions close
to ours are the one by Michelacci and Suarez (2004), and the one by Bauer and Ro-
driguez Mora (2012). The former introduce the process of entrepreneurial nance into
an endogenous growth model, although their focus is on the role of a well developed
stock market in fostering innovation and growth. The latter investigate the e¤ects
of (endogenous) search and bargaining frictions on the dynamics of a growing econ-
omy (both a Solow-like economy and an AK-type economy). They neglect welfare
considerations, that represent a major focus of our analysis.
3 The Model
The economy is composed of three sectors: (i) a nal good sector, in which the nal
good is produced competitively employing labor and an array of intermediate goods;
(ii) an intermediate good sector, in which each intermediate good is produced and sold
by a monopolistic rm, and (iii) the industry of ideas, which employs entrepreneurs
and capitalists to introduce new varieties of intermediate goods. These ideas, that
result from a successful matching between them, are immediately patented and sold to
intermediate good rms that monopolize the market for that particular variety. Let us
start from the characterization of the sector where innovation takes place.
3.1 The Industry of Ideas
Total population in this economy is denoted by L and is assumed to be growing ex-
ponentially at constant rate n (we omit time subscripts for notational simplicity).
Economic agents have to decide whether to work in the industry of ideas or in the
nal good sector. In the rst case, they can act as entrepreneurs or as capitalists.
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Denoting by LE; LF ; LY respectively the number of entepreneurs, capitalists and nal
good workers, the labor market clearing condition writes as
LE + LF + LY = L:
An agent devoting her unit of time to innovation comes up with a new idea. How-
ever, in order for this raw entrepreneurial idea to become a marketable innovation,
the idea needs the support of a capitalist evaluating its potential protability. An
innovation is the result of a process of successful search and matching between an
entrepreneur and a capitalist. The innovation function - representing the production
function of knowledge - is a constant-return-to-scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas technology:
_A =   (LE)a (LF )1 a ; (1)
where A is the (increasing) measure of ideas (incorporated into intermediate input
varieties), and  2 R+ is a productivity parameter that captures the e¢ ciency of the
matching process.
Note that, when a = 1, the model collapses to a standard semi-endogenous growth
model (see for instance Jones, 1995b). Notice also that our results hold for any CRS
function. Cipollone and Giordani (2013), however, give an empirical estimate of the
innovation process taking place in the Business Angel market of the most developed
countries. They show that a CRS Cobb-Douglas technology is among the functional
specications that better capture the matching process between the business angels
and the entrepreneurs submitting their projects to them. This functional form is also
useful for tractability.4
Given the "matching function" in (1), the arrival rate of ideas (or the instantaneous
probability of matching) for entrepreneurs is
E =
_A
LE
=  

LF
LE
1 a
;
4Two more technical remarks on (1) are in order. First, the hypothesis of zero knowledge spillovers
- that is, the idea that the stock of knowledge A does not directly a¤ect the rate of innovation - is
only made for simplicity. Secondly, while at rst glance it may seem odd to admit the necessity of
capitalists for innovation and then not to consider capital as an input in the production function of
new knowledge, this assumption is only introduced to simplify the analysis and is without loss of
generality. We could have assumed a function such as
_A =  (LE)
a  (LF )b  (K)1 a b
Capital would be provided by an otherwise perfect nancial market thanks to the "intercession" of
capitalists.
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while the one for capitalists is
F =
_A
LF
=  

LE
LF
a
:
Let us now analyze the occupational choice of the agents in this economy. If they
work in the nal good sector (to be characterized in the next subsection), they gain a
wage rate, denoted by w. If they choose to become entrepreneurs, they gain the chance
of a successful matching with a capitalist, denoted by v0E. Finally, if they choose to
become capitalists, they gain the chance of a successful matching with an entrepreneur,
denoted by v0F (as we will see, in equilibrium it must be v
0
E = w = v
0
F ). We now use
dynamic programming to determine the values of the various states.
The expected payo¤ associated with becoming an entrepreneur is dened by the
following asset equation:
rv0E = E
 
v1E   v0E

+ _v0E; (2)
where r is the rental rate of capital, and v1E represents the value of a successful matching
for an entrepreneur. This value is dened by
rv1E =  + v
0
E   v1E + _v1E; (3)
where  is the fraction of the monopoly prots accruing to the entrepreneur prevailing
in the market. These asset equations have the usual interpretations. Equation (2) says
that the per period value of choosing to be an entrepreneur must be equal to the
probability of a successful matching with a capitalist times the payo¤ associated with
this chance, plus the capital gain or loss that may occur over time. An analogous
interpretation can be provided for equation (3). Solving the system in v0E and v
1
E, we
obtain
v0E =
E
r   _v0E
v0E

+ E

r   _v1E
v1E

+

r   _v1E
v1E

r   _v0E
v0E
 .
The value of v1E can then be obtained substituting for the expression of v
0
E given
above into the following:
v1E =
 + v0E
1 + r   _v1E
v1E
:
The expected payo¤ associated to becoming a capitalist is instead dened by
rv0F = F
 
v1F   v0F

+ _v0F ;
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where v1F represents the value of a successful matching for a capitalist, which is given
by5
rv1F =
 
1    + v0F   v1F + _v1F ;
where
 
1    is the fraction of the monopoly prots accruing to the capitalists
prevailing in the market. Solving the system in v0F and v
1
F we obtain
v0F =
 
1   F
r   _v0F
v0F

+ F

r   _v1F
v1F

+

r   _v1F
v1F

r   _v0F
v0F
 :
The value of v1F can be found by substituting for the expression above into
v1F =
 
1    + v0F
1 + r   _v1F
v1F
:
3.2 The Final Good Sector
Final good Y is produced competitively according to to the following Cobb-Douglas
technology:6
Y = L1 Y
Z A
0
xj dj;
where LY denotes total labor employed in the nal good sector, xj is the jth interme-
diate input, and A is the measure of varieties of these inputs. Competitive rms solve
the following maximization problem:
max
LY ;xj

L1 Y
Z A
0
xj dj   wLY  
Z A
0
pjxjdj

;
where pj is the price of the jth intermediate good, and where the nal good is assumed
as numeraire. From rst-order conditions, we obtain pj =  (xj=LY )
 1 and
w = (1  ) Y
LY
: (4)
5Assume for simplicity that each capitalist can enter into one and only one project at a time, and
that each entrepreneur needs one and only one capitalist.
6The rest of the model follows a standard scale-free endogenous growth model with horizontal
innovation. The closest framework is Jones (1995b).
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3.3 The Intermediate Good Sector
The intermediate good sector is composed of an innite number of rms distributed
along the measure [0; A]. After having purchased the (innitely-lived) patent for a
variety of intermediate good from the market of ideas, each of these rms monopolizes
the market for that particular variety. One unit of raw capital, rented at rate r,
produces one unit of any intermediate input. No depreciation takes place. The jth
intermediate good producer solves the following standard monopoly problem:
max
xj
[pj (xj)xj   rxj] :
Substituting for pj given from above and maximizing we obtain
xj =

r
2
 1
 1
LY  x and pj = r

 p 8j:
We can also give an expression for the monopoly prots as
j =  (1  ) Y
A
  8j: (5)
Note that the symmetric structure of the economy makes quantities, prices and
prots independent of the specic variety produced. Thus it is
K =
Z A
0
xjdj =
Z A
0
xdj = Ax:
As a result, the aggregate production function can be written in the more familiar
expression
Y = (K) (ALY )
1 
: (6)
Given that the functional distribution of income implies
wLY + rK + A = Y;
substituting for w and  given above, we obtain
r = 2
Y
K
;
implying that capital receives a smaller share of the average product of capital com-
pared to the perfect competition case.
10
3.4 Consumption Decisions
Finally, consider the consumption decision of the representative household. Follow-
ing the standard formalization, the problem is the one of maximizing an additively
separable utility function, such as
U =
1Z
0
exp [ t] c (t)
1    1
1   dt
(where c represents consumption per capita, C=L) under the usual dynamic budget
constraint ( _K = Y   C). The time path of consumption per capita must obey the
following Euler equation
_c
c
=
1

(r (t)    n) : (7)
4 The Balanced Growth Path
From now onwards we focus on the steady state. From the labor market clearing
condition it must be that, along the balanced growth path, gLF = gLE = gLY = n.
Dividing the production function for ideas by A
gA =
  (LE)a (LF )1 a
A
;
and taking logs and derivatives, we obtain that
gA = n;
that is to say, the rate of technological progress in this economy is equal to the growth
rate of population. Given the expression of the aggregate production function (6), the
growth rate of income per capita, y = Y=L, must also be equal to n (as usual in the
class of "semi-endogenous" innovation-driven growth models).
From (7), and knowing that _c=c = _y=y = n, we can determine the (constant) value
of r along the steady state, which is
r = n (+ 1) + : (8)
Working on (2), we derive that in steady state _v0E=v
0
E = _v
1
E=v
1
E.
7 Moreover, dividing
(3) by v1E and rearranging, we get
1 + r   v
0
E
v1E
  _v
1
E
v1E
=

v1E
:
7We obtain this by dividing both sides of (2) by v0E and using the fact that E must be constant
along the steady state.
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Knowing that all terms on the left-hand side are constant along the steady state,
then it must be _v1E=v
1
E = _=. Since from (5) we know that the latter is equal to n, it
must be _v0E=v
0
E = _v
1
E=v
1
E = n.
Along the steady state, and exploiting condition (8), values v0E and v
1
E can then
nally be expressed as
v0E =
E
(n+ ) (1 + E) + (n+ )
2 and v
1
E =
 + v0E
1 + n+ 
: (9)
Repeating exactly the same steps for v0F and v
1
F , we obtain
v0F =
 
1   F
(n+ ) (1 + F ) + (n+ )
2 and v
1
F =
 
1    + v0F
1 + n+ 
: (10)
Dening employment across the three activities in share values, that is, dening
variables li  Li=L for i = Y;E; F , we can characterize the steady state equilibrium as
the triple (lY ; lE; lF ) that solves the following system8><>:
v0E = w
v0F = w
lE + lF + lY = 1;
(11)
where the expressions for v0E; v
0
F and w are respectively given in (9), (10) and (4).
The rst two equations of (11) state that, at equilibrium, the returns from being
employed in the manufacturing sector must be equal to the expected returns from en-
trepreneurial as well as from capitalistic activities. Notice that, while w is a certain
income, both v0E and v
0
F are uncertain. They must be equal at equilibrium even for
risk-averse agents however, because - as usual in the class of innovation-driven growth
models (Grossman and Helpman, 1991b) - investors are able to completely diversify
their portfolio along the interval of intermediate good sectors [0; A] through the inter-
mediation of costless nancial institutions and, hence, they are able to hedge completely
against the volatility of the innovation returns.
While the third equation of (11) represents the labor market-clearing condition,
the rst two equations can be interpreted as the implicit best response functions of,
respectively, entrepreneurs to capitalists and of capitalists to entrepreneurs. It is easy
to prove that both functions are positively-sloped (dli=dl i > 0 for i = E;F ), thus
signaling a strategic complementarity between the two main actors of the innovation
process. The intuition for this complementarity goes as follows. In the rst equation,
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capturing the e¤ect of capitalists on entrepreneurs, an increase in lF raises the proba-
bility of matching E for an entrepreneur, and thus it raises the expected returns from
becoming entrepreneur, v0E. This induces a rise in the number of entrepreneurs. A
totally symmetric reasoning applies to the second equation.8
Using (9), (10), (4) and (5), and using the fact that _A=A = n, E = _A=LE,
F = _A=LF , we can rewrite system (11) as8>>><>>>:
n
lY
lE
(n+)(1+E)+(n+)
2 = 1
n(1 ) lYlF
(n+)(1+F )+(n+)
2 = 1
lE + lF + lY = 1
(12)
where E =   (lF=lE)1 a and F =   (lE=lF )a. While system (12) cannot be solved
explicitly in the three unknowns lE; lF ; lY , the strategic complementarity between en-
trepreneurs and nanciers indicates the theoretical possibility of multiple equilibria.
As usual in the class of innovation-driven growth models, the monopolistic rent 
associated with the new variety of intermediate good is totally extracted by the oper-
ators of the innovation sector. In a perfectly competitive market for entrepreneurial
and capitalistic skills, the operatorscontributions to the innovation process would be
paid proportionally to their marginal productivities. From (1), the marginal produc-
tivities for entrepreneurs and capitalists can be written respectively as a (lF=lE)
1 a
and (1  a)  (lE=lF )a. This allocative rule then implies that the prot share ratio
(=
 
1   ) be equal to the marginal productivity ratio (a (lF=lE)1 a = (1  a)  (lE=lF )a),
that is, and simplifying where possible:

c
1  c
 = a
1  a 
lF
lE
: (13)
where superscript c refers to competition in the market for entrepreneurial and capi-
talistic skills. Expression (13) tells us that the prot shares accruing to entrepreneurs
and nanciers are governed by two forces: the relative elasticities of innovation to the
inputs (a= (1  a)) and their relative number (lF=lE). Solving (13) for c, we obtain

c
=
a
1 a
lF
lE
1 + a
1 a
lF
lE
:
8Cipollone and Giordani (2013) provide empirical evidence that support the existence of such
complementarity in the business angel market. They also study the theoretical implications of this
complementarity for the dynamics of the innovation process in a partial equilibrium framework.
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As expected, the entrepreneursprot share responds positively to a and lF and
negatively to lE (and, of course, viceversa for capitalists).9 Although we cannot nd
the explicit values for the three unknowns lcE; l
c
F ; l
c
Y (even after substituting for 
c
found
above inside system (12)), we can however prove their sub-optimality (see Section 5).
4.1 The Steady-State under Nash Bargaining of Monopoly
Rents
In the classical economic literature on search and matching (as of Diamond, 1982,
Mortensen, 1982, and Pissarides, 1984), the general idea of a decentralized market
is captured via a model where potential traders are brought together pairwise by
a given stochastic matching technology and, once together, their terms of trade are
determined instantaneously as the outcome of a bargaining process that uses a given
surplus-sharing rule(Hosios, 1990, p. 279). In the next subsection, and in line with
the rest of the literature on entrepreneurial nance cited in Section 2, we follow this
tradition and combine search and matching with a bargaining process between the two
actors of the innovation process over the distribution of monopoly rents. We do it
because this is how both leading scholars in the eld (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), as
well practitioneers in the venture capital market, say this market works in practice:
an equity contract between the entrepreneur and the nancier, where their respective
share of future prots reects their current bargaining power.10
Now suppose that, when a successful matching occurs, the entrepreneur and the
capitalist bargain over the prots generated by that match, . In particular, suppose
that the shares of these prots are determined as a solution to a generalized Nash
bargaining problem. When an entrepreneur and a capitalist meet, they negotiate over
9Note that the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists highlighted above
is here reinforced by the additional e¤ect passing through the (now endogenous) prot share, 
c
: given
that d
c
=dlF > 0, an increase in lF raises the entrepreneursprot share (
c
) and thus further raises
the returns from becoming an entrepreneur. A totally symmetric reasoning applies to the e¤ect of
entrepreneurs on capitalists.
10Moreover, this bargaining power is not immutable over time but responds to the ups and downs of
the market. For instance, Inderst and Muller (2004) provide anecdotal evidence on the 2001 internet
bubble: during the peak, as "too much money was chasing too few deals" (Gompers and Lerner,
2000), entrepreneurs were able to obtain very good contractual conditions. The successive burst of
the bubble, however, brought about "changes in deal terms... all of which [were] designed to enhance
returns and the quantum of control enjoyed by nervous investors" (Bartlett, 2001, as cited by Inderst
and Muller, 2004, p. 321).
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their respective share of monopoly prots (; 1 ) taking as given the shares prevailing
in the market (; 1   ). Reminding the expressions for v1E and v1F written in (9) and
(10), we can dene the surpluses as
SE = v
1
E   v0E =
 + v0E
1 + n+ 
  v0E =
   v0E (n+ )
1 + n+ 
; (14)
SF = v
1
F   v0F =
(1  )  + v0F
1 + n+ 
  v0F =
(1  )    v0F (n+ )
1 + n+ 
;
where v0E; v
0
F are interpreted as the threat points for, respectively, the entrepreneur and
the capitalist.
The Nash bargaining problem is the one of maximizing the following expression
with respect to :
(SE)
  (SF )1  ;
where  stands for the bargaining power of the entrepreneur. Taking the rst order
condition and simplifying, we obtain
SF   (1  )SE = 0:
Plugging the values for SE, SF written in (14) into the above expression and rear-
ranging we obtain
 =  + (1  ) v0E (n+ )  v0F (n+ ) : (15)
Knowing that
v0E =
E
(n+ ) (1 + E) + (n+ )
2 , v
0
F =
 
1   F
(n+ ) (1 + F ) + (n+ )
2 ;
where  is the prot share of the entrepreneur prevalent in the market, and plugging
these values into (15), we obtain
 =  +
(1  ) E
1 + E + n+ 
  
 
1   F
1 + F + n+ 
:
Finally, knowing that in equilibrium it must be  = , we can solve for  to obtain

b
=
 [E + 1 + n+ ]
1 + n+ + E + (1  )F (16)
where superscript b stands for bargaining.
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Plugging the expression for 
b
given above into system (12) and simplifying where
possible, we nally obtain11 ;128>><>>:
nlY
(n+)(1+n++E+(1 )F ) =
lE

nlY
(n+)(1+n++E+(1 )F ) =
lF
1 
lE + lF + lY = 1:
(17)
It is immediate to show that lbE=l
b
F = = (1  ). This implies that the relative
importance of entrepreneurs over capitalists reects their respective bargaining power.
In particular, it is lbE > l
b
F if and only if  > 1=2, that is, if and only if the bargaining
power of entrepreneurs is higher than the one of capitalists. Given that that lbE=l
b
F =
= (1  ), the probabilities of matching along the steady state can be written as
bE = 

lbF
lbE
1 a
= 

1  

1 a
and bF = 

lbE
lbF
a
= 


1  
a
.
Plugging these values for bE and 
b
F into (17), we can nally explicitly solve the
system for lbE, l
b
F , l
b
Y and obtain
lbE =
n
n + (n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a ; (18)
lbF =
n (1  )
n + (n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a ; (19)
lbY =
(n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a
n + (n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a :
Comparative Statics. Let us analyze the relationship between employment in the
industry of ideas (lbE; l
b
F ) and the main parameters of the model. First, it is immediate
to prove that @lbi=@ < 0 (i = E;F ), that is, and rather reasonably, the higher the
discount rate, the lower the amount of resources devoted to innovation. It is also
@lbi=@ < 0 (i = E;F ): the lower the willingness to substitute consumption over time
(the higher ), the lower the employment in the innovation sector. Both these e¤ects
are standard in the class of horizontal innovation growth models.
11In particular, we divide the rst equation by (E + 1 + n + ), and the second equation by
(F + 1 + n+ ).
12Here again, the fact that d
b
=dlF is strictly positive strengthens the strategic complementarity
between entrepreneurs and capitalists that we have originally uncovered in system (12).
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It is also apparent that @lbi=@ < 0 (i = E;F ), meaning that a higher productivity
of the innovation function shifts resources from the industry of ideas to the nal good
sector. This instead, is in contrast to this class of growth models, where the researchers
productivity does not a¤ect employment in the R&D sector (Jones, 1995b).
Moreover, it is possible to prove that an increase in the entrepreneursbargain-
ing power raises the number of entrepreneurs and lowers the number of capitalists:
@lbE=@ > 0 and @l
b
F=@ < 0.
13 On the other hand, it is @lbi=@n > 0 (i = E;F ), that
is to say, and in line with this class of growth models, the e¤ect of the growth rate on
the industry of ideas is positive.
Finally, it can be shown that @lbi=@a > 0 (i = E;F ) if and only if  < 1=2,
implying that the productivity of entrepreneurs exerts a positive e¤ect on the overall
employment in the industry of ideas if and only if their barganing power is higher than
that of capitalists.
5 The Role of the Policy Maker
In this section, we analyze the opportunity for the policy makers intervention in the
nancial market of innovation. In particular, we rst carry out the welfare analysis; we
then compare the resulting optimal innovative e¤orts with the decentralized allocations
obtained in Section 4. Finally, we identify the policy measure that induces the optimal
total amount of resources devoted to innovation.
5.1 Welfare Analysis
The social planner problem can be expressed as
max
c(t);lF ;lE
1Z
0
exp ( t) c (t)
1    1
1   dt:
subject to the following constraints
y = k (AlY )
1  and _A = L (lE)
a  (lF )1 a
_k = y   c  nk and 1 = lE + lF + lY
13Di¤erently from the previous ones, this and the following two statements require a few algebraic
steps. We omit them however, as they are straightforward applications of di¤erential calculus.
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where all variables of interest are expressed in per capita terms, that is, c = C=L,
y = Y=L, k = K=L and, again, li = Li=L for i = E;F; Y . This problem of dynamic
optimization is fully worked out in Appendix A. The optimal allocation of employment
is characterized by the following number of, respectively, entrepreneurs, nanciers, and
nal good workers:14
lWE = a
"
1  + n
1  

+ n+ n

 
1 
#
; (20)
lWF = (1  a)
"
1  + n
1  

+ n+ n

 
1 
#
: (21)
lWY =
+ n
1  

+ n+ n

 
1 
; (22)
Dividing (20) by (21), we obtain the optimal ratio entrepreneurs/nanciers as
lWE =l
W
F = a= (1  a). We are now ready to compare the optimal innovative e¤orts
to those obtained under a decentralized market.
5.2 Optimal vs. Decentralized Innovative E¤orts
Consider rst the case without bargaining frictions, where entrepreneurs and nanciers
are paid according to their marginal productivities. If we impose the equality between
the left-hand sides of the rst two equations of (12), exploit (13) and simplify (+ n),
we obtain
lcE
lcF
=
264 a
1  a 
1 + + n+ 

lcE
lcF
a
1 + + n+ 

lcE
lcF
a 1
375
1
2
: (23)
While this equation cannot be solved exactly for the equilibrium ratio entrepre-
neurs/nanciers, it allows us to show easily that this ratio is di¤erent from the optimal
ratio. In fact, an equilibrium ratio lcE=l
c
F is any xed point of the function dened by
the right-hand side of (23). While this function is strictly increasing in lE=lF and may
admit more than one xed point, it is immediate to verify that a= (1  a) is not a xed
point of this function, and hence it is not a general solution to equation (23).
Under Nash bargaining, the equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/nanciers is instead
given by lbE=l
b
F = = (1  ), which again is di¤erent from the optimal ratio. Moreover,
14Note that, as it happens in this class of models (Jones, 1995b), the optimal allocation of employ-
ment does not depend on .
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it is immediate to verify from (18), (19), (20) and (21), that the total employment in
the industry of ideas under the Nash bargaining solution may be higher or lower than
the optimal number, lbE + l
b
F ? lWE + lWF .
There are three sources of market imperfections in this model that explain the sub-
optimality of the equilibrium innovative e¤orts. The rst, which is standard in the
class of innovation-driven growth models, is associated with the presence of imperfect
competition in the intermediate good sector, and it gives rise to what is usually called
the consumer surplus e¤ect. Given that the incentive to innovate (the monopoly prot)
is strictly lower than the overall social benets from the innovation (the consumer
surplus), this external e¤ect induces too little innovative e¤ort.
The second source of market friction is instead related to the search process intro-
duced via the production technology of new ideas (1). Each entry in the innovation
industry alters the research productivity of both entrepreneurs and capitalists. On the
one hand, the entry of an entrepreneur (capitalist) lowers the productivity of all other
entrepreneurs (capitalists). This negative e¤ect reminds us of the familiar stepping on
toes e¤ect, and is due to the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity of both
entrepreneurs and capitalists. This generates too much innovative e¤ort. On the other
hand, to the extent that input factors are technological complements in (1), the entry
of an entrepreneur raises the productivity of capitalists, and viceversa. In other words,
the higher the number of capitalists, the higher the chance of a successful matching
for an entrepreneur, and viceversa. This novel external e¤ect, that we could call easy
matching e¤ect, is positive and induces too little e¤ort in the industry of ideas.15
Finally, where a bargaining process is assumed to solve the prot sharing problem
of the two innovative actors (Subsection 4.1), a third market friction characterizes the
economy, which generates an equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/nanciers that reects
their respective bargaining power (; 1 ), rather than their productivity in the inno-
vation process (a; 1 a). In general, whether the economy devotes too few or too many
total labor resources to innovation, and whether the distribution of these resources is
tilted towards entrepreneurs or nanciers, ultimately depends on the relative strength
of all these external e¤ects characterizing the economy.
15More formally, given that economic agents have zero measure in our economy, when making their
occupational choice, they perceive their productivity as constant, that is: _A = Li, i = E;F . This
, capturing the creativity of the marginal agent, is however equal to La 1i L
1 a
 i . Hence,  is a
decreasing function of Li (stepping on toes e¤ect), and an increasing function of L i (easy matching
e¤ect).
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5.3 The Optimal Tax/Subsidy on Monopolistic Prots
Given that we have found an explicit solution for both optimal and equilibrium innov-
ative e¤orts under Nash Bargaining, it may be interesting to characterize explicitly the
optimal innovation policy. The policy we consider in this section is one of tax/subsidy
on the monopolistic prots. Denote a prot subsidy rate (or tax rate if negative) by
s 2 R. As a result, the new monopoly prots can be written as  (1 + s). Subsi-
dies (taxes) are assumed to be withdrawn (transferred) from (to) the representative
household, so that its intertemporal budget constraint remains una¤ected.
Ideally, the objective of the policy intervention would be the one of inducing the
optimal shares of entrepreneurs and capitalists, lWE ; l
W
F . This policy, however, is un-
feasible for the simple reason that a single instrument cannot reach two distinct goals
at the same time. In what follows, we rst characterize the policy that equalizes the
total innovative e¤orts to the socially optimal ones, lWE + l
W
F . We then argue that, even
though the resulting ratio entrepreneurs vs. capitalists is di¤erent from the optimal
ratio lWE =l
W
F , it is still welfare maximizing to devote this total amount of labor resources
to innovation.
Along the steady state, the chance of a successful matching for either entrepreneurs
or capitalists, as a function of the prot subsidy/tax, is worth respectively
v0E (s) =
E (1 + s)
(n+ ) (1 + E) + (n+ )
2 ,
v0F (s) =
 
1  F (1 + s)
(n+ ) (1 + F ) + (n+ )
2 :
Going through exactly the same steps followed in Subsection 4.1, we nally obtain
the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs and capitalists, again as a function of the
prot subsidy/tax, as
lbE (s) =
n (1 + s)
n (1 + s) + (n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a ; (24)
lbF (s) =
n (1  ) (1 + s)
n (1 + s) + (n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a : (25)
To obtain the total equilibrium innovative e¤orts equal to the socially optimal ones,
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we must then solve equation lbE (s) + l
b
F (s) = l
W
E + l
W
F by s. We nd
1 + s^ =

(n+ )2 + (n+ )
 
1 + 2a (1  )1 a 1  +n
1 

+n+n

 
1 

n

+n
1 

+n+n

 
1 
 7 1:
(26)
Exploiting the equilibrium expressions for lbE; l
b
F ; l
W
E ; l
W
F found in Subsections 4.1
and 5.1, (26) can be expressed as16
1 + s^ =
1  lWY
lWY
lbY
1  lbY
:
Implementing policy s^, however, is not enough to obtain the rst-best allocation of
labor resources. As it appears from expressions (24) and (25), this policy measure does
not alter the equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/capitalists, lbE (s) =l
b
F (s) = = (1  ),
which is di¤erent from the socially optimal ratio, a= (1  a). Ideally, the policy-maker
would be called to an additional policy intervention to establish an institutional and
legal system bringing  as close as possible to a, that is, a system such that the
bargaining power of entrepreneurs and capitalists reects their respective productivies
in the innovation process. While a thorough analysis of such policy is out of the scope
of this paper, we can however prove that s^ is still the optimal subsidy/tax rate even
when  6= a.17 In other words, it is still worth it (as a second-best policy) to induce a
total amount of resources devoted to innovation equal to the socially optimal amount
(lbE (s) + l
b
F (s) = l
W
E + l
W
F ), even when these resources are sub-optimally distributed
according to the respective bargaining power of entrepreneurs and capitalists and not
to their productivities.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has built a scale-free endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation.
An innovation is the outcome of a successful matching between an entrepreneur with
a good idea and a capitalist recognizing the value of that idea. Incentives to become
16To obtain the following expression, we have added and subtracted n
 
1  lWY

=nlWY from (26).
17This statement can be easily proven exploiting the properties of system (27) in the technical
appendix. While we obtain lWE =l
W
F = a= (1  a) from the second and third equation of the system,
the value for lWY given in (22) (and hence for its complement, l
W
E + l
W
F ) is instead obtained from the
other three equations, and independently of the ratio lWE =l
W
F .
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either entrepreneurs or capitalists come from the possibility of sharing the monopoly
prots associated with any innovation. The model investigates the occupational choice
of economic agents across the three possible activities they may undertake in this
economy: entrepreneurial, capitalistic and manufacturing activities. The occupational
equilibrium is dened as that conguration for which the expected returns from the
three activities are identical.
We have identied the stationary equilibrium conditions of this economy. We have
then investigated the characteristics of the equilibria and compared them to the opti-
mal allocation. A dual role for the policy maker emerges from the analysis. On the
one hand, the presence of search (and bargaining) frictions in the nancial market of
innovation calls for the policy makers intervention to correct them and help restore
optimality. On the other hand, in a world with multiple equilibria, where coordina-
tion failures between entrepreneurs and nanciers are possible, public policy can in
principle help the economy converge towards a better equilibrium.
In fact, the economy described above is potentially subject to a most disruptive
coordination failure in the nancial market of innovation, in which the labor resources
devoted to innovation are null. This "no-growth trap" (as any other coordination
failure) can easily be given a self-fullling interpretation. Innovators are willing to
spend their intellectual resources to discover a new idea only if they have the chance
to meet a nancier. At the same time, nanciers are willing to spend their intellectual
resources to evaluate the protability of ideas only if they have the chance to meet
valuable innovators. Hence, a coordination failure is possible, in which pessimistic
expectations may dissuade everybody from acting as either an entrepreneur or as a
capitalist. As a result, the innovation process stops abruptly and the economy stagnates
forever.
The possibility of coordination failures across economic agents may contribute to
explain why the venture capital industry may fail to take o¤ even in potentially highly
innovative economies. The lack of a favorable entrepreneurial climate may induce the
innovative actors of the society to expect nobody involved in the innovation process.
Unfortunately, these pessimistic expectations may turn out to be self-fullling. In this
respect, the role of the policy maker might be crucial in providing a coordination device
towards a more innovative balanced growth path, thus liberating the entrepreneurial
spirits of the economy.
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A Welfare Analysis
This problem of dynamic optimization dened at the beginning of Section 5 presents
three control variables, c (t) ; lF ; lE, and two state variables, k and A. The Hamiltonian
writes as
H (c; lE; lF ; k; A) =
c (t)1    1
1   + k
 
k (AlY )
1    c  nk+ A  L (lE)a  (lF )1 a ;
from which we obtain the following 5 conditions:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Hc = c (t)
    k = 0
HlE = AaL

lF
lE
1 a
  k (1  ) yly = 0
HlF = A (1  a)L

lE
lF
a
  k (1  ) yly = 0
Hk = k
 
 y
k
  n = k   _k
HA = A (1  ) yA = A   _A
(27)
Working on HlE and HlF we immediately obtain that the optimal ratio entrepre-
neurs/nanciers must be lE=lF = a= (1  a).
To nd the absolute values of lE and lF we now proceed as follows. We know that
in steady state it must be _c=c = n. Taking logs and derivative from the rst equation
in (27), we then obtain _k=k =  n. On the other hand, dividiing Hk by k and HA
by A we obtain
_k
k
=  
 


A
k
1 
(lY )
1    n
!
and
_A
A
=   (1  )

A
k
 
(lY )
1  (28)
where we have also exploited the expression for the production function y stated in
one of the problems constraints. Solving the rst of the two equations in (28) by A=k
and plugging it into the second, we obtain
_A
A
=   (1  ) (lY )1 
"
1
 (lY )
1 
 
+ n 
_k
k
!#  
1 
:
Knowing that in steady state it is _k=k = _A=A =  n, we can nally solve
the last equation for lY in function of all parameters of the model and obtain (22)
in the main text. Given that 1 = lE + lF + lY , and that lE=lF = a= (1  a), it is
easy to characterize the optimal number of entrepreneurs and nanciers as given in,
respectively, (20) and (21).
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